The role of the media agenda in a context of political polarization by González Rodríguez, Juan Jesús & Novo Vázquez, María Amparo
V
ol
. X
X
IV
 •
 N
º 
2 
   
   
 C
 y
 S
 •
 2
01
1
131
JUAN JESÚS GONzáLEz Y AMPARO NOVO
jgonzalez@poli.uned.es, anovo@uniovi.es
Juan Jesús González, profesor de Estructura social. Fa-
cultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología UNED. 28040 
Madrid. 
Amparo Novo, profesora de Sociología. Facultad de 
Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Oviedo. 33006 
Oviedo.
AbstrAct: This article addresses the 
role of the media agenda in the con-
text of political polarization that has 
predominated in Spain over the last 
decade. Starting from a first hypoth-
esis regarding the relationship be-
tween political polarization and the 
median voter, the article focuses not 
only on the ability of the media to 
impose and manage a specific the-
matic agenda, obsessively concen-
trated on terrorism, but also to make 
the government responsible for the 
subjects on the agenda, as can be 
seen from the dominant framing of 
terrorism:“weakness and conces-
sion”. 
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Resumen: Este artículo estudia el pa-
pel de la agenda de los medios en el 
contexto de polarización política que 
ha predominado en España durante 
la década pasada. A partir de una pri-
mera hipótesis acerca de la relación 
entre la polarización política y el vo-
tante mediano, el artículo se centra 
no sólo en la capacidad de los medios 
para imponer y manejar una agenda 
temática específica, obsesivamente 
concentrada en el terrorismo, sino 
también para hacer responsable al 
gobierno por ello, tal como se des-
prende del encuadre dominante del 
terrorismo: “debilidad y concesión”.
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1. The context: political polarization and loss of responsiveness to the median 
voter1
In contrast to the conventional assumption that political parties compete 
for the median voter, this article is based on the hypothesis that, in recent 
times, parties have tended to forget this voter and have competed to satisfy 
interests that are increasingly distant from those of the median voter. This 
hypothesis has been widely documented by Jacobs and Shapiro (2000), who 
study the polarization strategies that have dominated in the US since the 
eighties. In the Spanish case, the polarization is inexplicable unless we take 
into account the influence of the media system as a factor of polarization 
and, more specifically, the peculiarities of the system known as “polarized 
pluralism” (Hallin and Mancini 2004). In fact, the first phase of political 
polarization, at the end of the Felipe González socialist period, occurred at 
a moment of maximum media polarization, due to the liberalization of the 
television media and the resulting struggle to form and control the new me-
dia holdings (González 2008). Thus, today’s political-media alignments were 
shaped largely in the early nineties, and they served as a breeding ground for 
Aznar’s political polarization. In this case, the political-media strategy was 
easy to understand: while the PP devoted itself to harassing Felipe González, 
the parallel media devoted themselves to exploiting the socialist scandals, 
thus undermining the government and providing a paradigmatic example of 
what Castells has called “the politics of scandal” (Castells 2009).  
More intriguing is the second phase of polarization, which began during 
the second PP term, shortly after this party won the absolute majority in the 
2000 elections. Aznar’s decision is the best example of our original hypothe-
sis: far from competing for the median voter, the parties give preference to 
their core constituencies, despite the election risk that this involves. More 
specifically, what this example suggests is that the parties are responsive to 
the demands of the median voter while they are trying to get their vote, 
but they become radical once they are in power. Would it not be more rea-
sonable for them to continue to be responsive in order not to lose the me-
dian voters’ support, according to the conventional assumption about party 
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge all the support received from the Centro de Investiga-
ciones Sociológicas (CIS), which provided funding for the Project “Voto racional y agenda 
mediática: estudio de seguimiento de la legislatura (2006-2008)”, which is the main empirical 
source for this article. The working team included Fermín Bouza, Raquel Rodríguez, Antón R. 
Castromil, and Palmira Chavero. The authors thank them all for their collaboration.
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competition? The problem is that both US and Spanish experience have 
recurrently shown not only the parties’ lack of responsiveness but that this 
lack of responsiveness occurs despite severe election defeats, indicating that 
punishment in the elections does not seem to be enough to mend their lack 
of political responsiveness to the median voter. 
How can we explain this choice in favor of polarization? There are several 
reasons that polarization is a rational option for the parties, if we understand 
it as a strategy oriented toward reducing the center of the electoral spectrum 
by encouraging its potential inhabitants to abandon it and go over to one of 
the sides in the conflict. 
• The first reason is that polarization increases the feeling of insecurity 
in less ideological and more moderate voters, making it easier to close ranks 
around two ideological bands that become the trenches (Corrales 2005)2. 
• The second reason is that polarization induces symmetrical responses 
from the political adversary that generate a spiral of threats and uncertain-
ties, reinforcing the previous mechanism (Ibid.).
• The third reason is that people bail out from the ideological space of 
the center, because they abandon the political game and therefore take re-
fuge in abstention (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). Turning politics into 
an agonistic task that exhausts itself but does not provide any improvement 
in coexistence or problem solving induces feelings of rejection, and even of 
cynicism (“they are all the same”), discouraging the political participation of 
the moderates. 
This explains how the PP was able to compete with the PSOE, even 
though its position in the ideological spectrum was worse that the PSOE’s 
position, as can be gathered from the evolution of the median voter’s self-
placement and placement of the parties throughout recent terms. In March 
1996, shortly after the general elections, the median voter placed herself at 
4.7 on the conventional left-right scale, very close to the PSOE which, des-
pite having lost the elections, still held a privileged position from this point 
of view (4.5). In contrast, the median voter remained very far from the PP, 
which he placed over three points away. Four years later, shortly before the 
PP won the absolute majority, the median voter placed herself two tenths 
further to the right, moving half a point away from the PSOE and that much 
toward the PP, which she then placed at 7.6. After the March 2004 elections, 
the median voter leaned toward the center-left (4.8) again, moving away 
2 In the end, polarization aspires to replace the distribution of preferences, which is typically 
a normal distribution around a more or less central midpoint, with a bimodal distribution.
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from the PP once again (7.8) and toward the PSOE (see Table 1). Despite 
the repeated attempts to “travel toward the center,” it did not seem like a 
very good idea for the PP to dispute the elections on ideological grounds 
based on these data. Thus, they resorted to polarization. 
However, this does not mean that the polarization strategy that the PP 
has followed recently is a guarantee of success in the elections. In fact, the 
experience of the 2004 and 2008 elections, which ended with a socialist vic-
tory, suggests, rather, that this strategy turns against their election interests. 
In this case, why do they persist in using this strategy? A careful study of the 
2008 elections suggests that the socialist victory occurred at the expense of 
a certain ideological movement of the PSOE; even though it is true that 
the PSOE increased its representation, this was compatible with a similar 
increase for the PP, which suggests that zapatero gained votes for the left at 
the expense of the center (González and Bouza 2009: 173 ff). From this point 
of view, the election results are ambivalent, considering that, as long as the 
PSOE continues to win more votes, it will be obtaining them, according to 
this explanation, from a position farther to the left. This indicates that the 
polarization strategy has two kinds of effects:
• On one hand, it works against the PP because it contributes to mobilize 
the left instead of reducing participation in the elections, which would be its 
goal3. 
• While, on the other, it manages to move the PSOE away from the cen-
ter, weakening the PSOE’s strategic power. 
According to this explanation, polarization has a double consequence: 
on one hand, the dynamic of polarization turns against those who promote 
it (the PP) because, far from inhibiting participation in the elections (which 
was its purpose), it stimulates it. In fact, participation was 75%, the highest 
in all the continuity elections held in Spain: 1979, 1986, 1989, and 2000. 
The second consequence is that this very same dynamic of polarization has 
helped to move the PSOE away from the center on the ideological axis. Ac-
3 We should recall the declarations of the PP election strategist to the Financial Times on the 
eve of the elections: “Elorriaga states that the PP is attempting to incite the socialist voters to 
abstain”, El País Feb. 29, 2008. “Our whole strategy is based on the undecided socialist voters”, 
he stated, in an interview with the British newspaper Financial Times. “We know that (the 
undecided socialist voters) will never vote for us. But if we can sow enough doubt about the 
economy, about immigration, and about nationalist issues, then maybe they will stay home”, 
the politican added. On the other hand, we should keep in mind the studies that relate the in-
crease in political tension to the increase in participation in the elections, a relation in which 
media negativity plays an important role (Martin 2008).
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cording to the CIS series, the PSOE has been moving toward the left since 
1996, with a total movement of five tenths, most of which has happened in 
the last term (three tenths). If we consider that the median voter has remai-
ned relatively stable during this time (except in the 2000 elections, when 
he moved three tenths of a point toward the center), the result is that the 
distance between the PSOE and the median voter has risen from two tenths, 
in 1996, to eight tenths in 2008. 
Table 1. Self-placement and placement of the PP, PSOE, and IU on the 
ideological scale (averages)
March 96 Feb. 00 March 04* March 08*
Median voter 4.7 5.0 4.8 4.8
PP 7.9 7.6 7.8 7.8
PSOE 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.0
IU 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4
Source: CIS studies 2210 (post-election 1996), 2382 (pre-election 2000), 2559 (post-election 
2004) and 2750 (pre-election). *The 2004 and 2008 surveys were weighted for vote recall4.
2. Hypothesis and methodology
From the communication point of view, this first socialist term was very 
different from the first popular (PP) term. While the first Aznar government 
managed to impose a line of communication (“Spain’s doing well”) in which 
the economic prosperity influenced the perception of the political situation 
positively (González 2002; Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2010), what we observed in 
this term was, rather, the contrary: a negative influence of politics on the per-
ception of prosperity, as a result of a dynamic of political confrontation that 
began with the PP’s resistance to accepting its election defeat in March 2004 
and with the media frenzy that followed the March 11 terrorist attacks before 
those elections. One of the results of this dynamic of polarization is that, 
contrary to what happened in Aznar’s first term, when the political situation 
was perceived through the lens of economic prosperity, the perception of 
prosperity in this last term was contaminated by political tension (Fundación 
4 The reason that the sample was weighted for vote recall is that, since the 2004 elections, the 
surveys have been affected by a problem of infra-representation of PP voters (Balaguer 2010).
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Alternativas 2007 and 2008; Maravall 2008). In this sense, the PSOE has 
missed a historical opportunity to profit from its economic management by 
challenging the PP’s superior competence on these grounds. 
We should, at this point, remember that, given the characteristic pattern 
of public opinion in the Spanish case, the audience is accustomed to the 
ritual countering of proclamations and accusations that appeal less to their 
capacity for rational evaluation than to their affective and ideological iden-
tification with one of the sides in the contest. Rational argumentation and 
the debate of ideas has been replaced by a trench journalism whose aggres-
siveness is only comparable to its laxness and permissiveness, given its lack 
of commitment to even the most elementary rules of impartial information 
and journalistic professionalism (remember the way the director of the ABC, 
José Antonio zarzalejos, was fired one month before the elections for refusing 
to participate in the so-called “conspiration theory”; zarzalejos 2010). As a 
result, the media polarization that characterizes the Spanish case moved far-
ther and farther away from a commitment to inform and from the function of 
opinion formation within its audience and was finally eclipsed by the exclusive 
imperative of taking sides (Díaz Nosty 2005). 
As we will see shortly, the climate of public opinion reached its most dra-
matic moment during the pre-campaign for the municipal and autonomous 
community elections in 2007, when the media agenda became overwhel-
mingly dominated by the terrorist issue, with the resulting displacement and 
marginalization of the rest of government performance. Before the general 
election, the media agendas became diversified with new issues: the Catho-
lic Church-government conflict, the -then suspected- economic crisis, and 
immigration, but this did not, according to the CIS post-election study, pre-
vent terrorism from being “the issue debated the most by the parties and the 
candidates throughout the campaign”, as we will see. 
Based on these observations, the article focuses on discussing the conven-
tional assumption of communications studies that the influence of the media 
comes not only from their capacity to impose a certain thematic agenda but 
also from their capacity to facilitate the attribution of responsibility accor-
ding to which the voters evaluate the government’s performance. This as-
sumption has, therefore, two components: first, the media select a repertoire 
of issues in order to suggest a certain reading of the current political situation 
to the voters (McCombs 2004). During an election campaign, this repertoire 
is, besides, the thematic path along which the voters must circulate before 
reaching a voting decision. Independently of whether the issues are framed 
in one way or another and that certain interpretations of this current situa-
tion come from that, the thematic agenda is never innocent, insofar as the 
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selection of issues can lead to different conclusions. From this perspective, 
the critical point in an election campaign is the degree of identification or 
fit between the media agendas and the citizens’ agendas, so that the media’s 
first objective is for their audiences to interiorize their thematic proposal and 
make it their own. However, it is not only a matter of the media managing to 
convey this set of issues to the audience, but also of whether this goes along 
with attributing responsibility for these issues to the government, and whe-
ther the audience accepts this attribution or not (Iyengar 1991). 
We must also consider that the process of creating the thematic agenda 
(thematization) tends to replace ideology and party programs as a factor of 
political alignment (Badia 1992: 171 ff). In this sense, the thematic leading 
role of terrorism in the framework of the polarization strategies implemented 
by the Popular Party (Sampedro and Sánchez Duarte 2008; Sampedro and 
Seoane 2008) did nothing more than take this process to its logical limits, 
thus illustrating a communication pattern that tends to substitute positio-
nal issues –the issues that mark an ideological position, namely social and 
economic policies– with ideologically transversal subjects such as terrorism 
(Maravall 2008). 
As for methodology, we based our work on an panel study with focus 
groups of Madrid voters that met every six months throughout the last term 
(specifically, from Spring 2006 to the 2008 elections), selected for being cen-
ter voters: position 5 in the ideological scale. Given the growing importance 
of the media in the process of voting decisions, we followed the media agenda 
as we studied these voters’ behavior, so that each of the four waves of this 
study was preceded by a study of the reference press during approximately 
two months, in order to gather the most significant phenomena of the selec-
tion and framing of information. Because the study is limited to Madrid, we 
followed the three most representative titles of the Madrid press: El País, El 
Mundo and ABC, which provide the basic frames of perception and evalua-
tion of the political situation. Once the main subjects of the agenda establis-
hed by these media were identified, we went on to formulate their respective 
frames, each of which was made up of two elements: diagnosis of the problem 
and attribution of responsibility (Entman 1993, Kinder and Nelson 2005, 
Schnell and Callaghan 2005). 
Given the class position of our focus groups’ members (working class), 
their exposition to the media and, especially, to the press is limited, but they 
are not uninfluenced by them. It is true that the Spanish press, as occurs in 
Mediterranean countries in general, has a limited impact in terms of rea-
ders, outside of the middle classes, but today’s multimedia groups incorporate 
a variety of resources (radio, TV, internet) capable of expanding the news 
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and opinions coming from the press all over the country. We assume, from 
this perspective, that there is a continuous flux of frames that comes from 
the press of reference and spreads across radio and TV, which serve as lo-
udspeakers for the press. Once the agenda and the frames are identified, we 
must study how our panel groups work with the information coming from the 
media, integrating it into their own personal experience and their cultural 
pattern, which amounts studying the interdependence between the media and 
the public (Entman 1989).
The methodology employed requires some clarification. The most com-
mon way of using group dynamics for psycho-sociological purposes is to con-
voke a series of individuals from a similar social background who meet a sin-
gle time, so that the individuals recognize one another as members of a group 
due to their shared sociodemographic and sociolinguistic characteristics, but 
without any primary elements that condition their feeling of belonging to 
the group. In our case, the working of the panel groups involves two issues: 
• The first issue is that the panel groups facilitate the study not only of the 
voting decision as such, but of the decision-making process as a whole, from 
a non-election moment (the middle of the term, when the elections are not 
yet in sight) to the post-election moment, right through the climax of the 
process: the pre-electoral or decision moment. 
• The second issue is that, even though the election decision is indivi-
dual, the decision process is not necessarily individual; it is, rather, the result 
of interaction in the family, at work, etc. That is, it is the result of small-
group interaction processes regarding which the panel study is a simulation. 
The second clarification is related to group dynamics and how they vary 
throughout the research process. To start with, the study focused on the main 
factors that nourish these voters’ discourse on politics: media messages, per-
sonal experience, and popular wisdom (Gamson 1992). In the initial phase, 
the first waves of the study, corresponding to non-election periods, follow 
a deliberately non-directive dynamic so that the groups will establish their 
own thematic agenda spontaneously, allowing us to compare and contrast 
it with the media agenda, as gathered from the front pages of the reference 
press. Studies on the influence of the media suggest that the relationship bet-
ween media and audiences is the result of a diverse and complex interaction 
(Curran 2005; Callejo 1995), which suggests that it would be a good idea to 
inquire into the way our groups adopt certain elements of media discourse 
in their personal experience, highlighting the elements that are congruent 
with their experience and omitting or rejecting those that are not. When the 
moment of the election arrives, group dynamics become more directive: the 
moderator begins to ask about the voting decision right before the elections 
EL PAPEL DE LA AGENDA MEDIáTICA EN UN CONTEXTO DE POLARIzACIÓN POLíTICA
V
ol
. X
X
IV
 •
 N
º 
2 
   
   
 C
 y
 S
 •
 2
01
1
139
and then asks the group members to justify this decision, in order to classify 
the voters and extract a typology of votes (rational, ideological…). 
Moreover, one of the tasks assigned to the panel groups relies on the eva-
luation of the frames taken from the media and, particularly, of their two 
main ingredients: diagnosis and attribution of responsibility. Once the frames 
have been evaluated and we understand the functioning of the attribution of 
responsibility regarding each of the issues, we will estimate the influence of 
each issue on the voting decision with the support of the CIS panel survey 
concerning the 2008 elections. In order to do that, the pre-electoral wave of 
this survey provides us with the evaluation of government’s performance on 
each of the issues. How much does the electorate’s evaluation of each of the-
se issues influence the decision whether to vote for the PSOE or for the PP? 
We will try to answer this question twice: first we will take as reference all 
the voters and then we will repeat the same model just for the center voters. 
Given that the later are less influenced by ideology, we expect the influence 
of the issues to be higher among them. 
3. The evolution of the media agenda and its electoral implications 
It’s important to keep in mind that, after the attack on Barajas airport 
(December 2006), the media agenda concentrated obsessively on the ne-
gotiation with ETA and its ramifications, so that during the three months 
before the municipal and autonomous community elections of May 2007, 
government action was practically taken right off the public agenda. We 
referred to a sample of nearly two hundred headlines and editorials in the 
reference press corresponding to the current national political situation du-
ring this period and found that 44 were devoted to ANV (the ETA election 
brand), 35 to terrorism, 23 to 11-M, 13 to city planning corruption, and 
only 22 to the campaign issues themselves. With these precedents, it was not 
happenstance that terrorism became the second most important problem, 
after unemployment and ahead of immigration, on the agenda of national 
problems, according to the CIS series 
We should pause for a moment to think about the genesis of this process, 
and to do this we will use the press study carried out during the first waves 
of our own study which, as we mentioned, focused on the Madrid reference 
press: ABC, El Mundo and El País. The Spring of 2006 (the first wave of our 
study) was dominated, in terms of public opinion, by ETA’s declaration of a 
truce and the resulting initiation of conversations between this organization 
and the government, which allowed the press that was sympathetic to the 
government, represented by El País, to frame these conversations as a “peace 
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process”. In the fall of this same year (the second wave of the study), howe-
ver, two critical events occurred: on one hand, the arms robbery in France 
that cast doubt on the aforementioned “peace process”, and at the same time 
the crisis of the cayuco fishing boats which cast doubt on the issue of the 
liberal framing of the regularization process for immigrants (“papers for ever-
yone”). This all led El País to a true framing crisis or misframing5. To the con-
trary, this critical juncture in Fall 2006 facilitated the work of ABC and El 
Mundo, who took over the terrorist issue in order to frame government action 
in terms of “concession and weakness”, or even of capitulation to ETA. The 
Barajas attack in December of this same year contributed to feed this frame 
and to keep it active until the 2007 municipal elections. 
When general elections came closer, the media agenda diversified, in-
corporating new issues such as the conflict between the government and the 
Catholic Church, the incipient economic crisis, and immigration. For the 
government, the easiest issue to handle was the first one, which was why the 
Popular Party managed to get it off the agenda and deactivate it. Regarding 
the second issue, voters proved to be quite sensitive faced with the worsening 
economic situation, yet they did not make the government responsible for 
it, given the global character of the crisis at the beginning. Finally, the Po-
pular Party brought immigration, an issue that had been taboo before, into 
the campaign, but the PP proved unable to formulate the problem and take 
advantage of voters’ high sensitivity to this issue6. Nevertheless, we must 
remember that, according to the CIS post-election survey, terrorism was the 
most frequently “discussed issue by parties and candidates during the cam-
paign.” That at least is how 28% of the people interviewed recalled it, com-
pared to 22.4% who recalled “economic problems” and 7.4% who recalled 
“immigration” as the issues discussed the most. This memory from the cam-
paign matches the media agenda well enough, with terrorism reaching first 
5 The idea of misframing comes from Goffman’s (1975 [2006]) classic study and refers to the 
rupture of the frame when the actors involved realize that it leads to deception and discredit 
(Ibídem. 313 ff). In the case we are studying, we can observe various symptoms of misframing. 
With reference to immigration, we can find some symptoms through the simple process of 
contrasting the printed and digital versions of this same newspaper (El País). These contra-
dictions were accompanied by editorials with the titles “Change in immigration” (September 
12, 2006), “Change in discourse” (September 17, 2006), etc. With reference to the “peace 
process,” under doubt because of the cited arms robbery, it led El País to repeatedly urge some 
kind of response from the government, in editorials titled “No dialogue with guns” (October 
25, 2006), “Need to be specific” (October 26, 2006), etc.
6 “56% support obliging immigrants to ‘respect Spanish customs’”, according to the El País 
Sunday headline (February 10, 2008).
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place among the campaign issues, as can be inferred from a study of the front 
pages and editorials published during the three months prior to the elections 
(see table 2). 
Table 2. Thematic media agenda: Headlines and editorials (from Jan. 1, 
2008 to March 9, 2008)
EL PAÍS EL MUNDO ABC Total
N (%)
Terrorism, ETA, ANV 23 36 11 70 (20.8%)
Economy, crisis 14 13 18 45 (13.4%)
Tax relief 4 4 5 13 (3.9%)
Immigration 9 4 3 16 (4.8%)
Church-government 
conflict
13 2 16 31 (9.2%)
Lack of safety 1 2 6 9 (2.7%)
Electoral debates 13 15 6 34 (10.1%)
Polls 3 11 7 21 (6.3%)
Campaign 18 19 18 55 (16.3%)
Other 20 11 11 42 (12.5%)
TOTAL 118 117 101 336
Source: prepared by authors. 
In order to explain what happened in the center of the ideological spec-
trum, we will proceed in two timeframes: we will begin by presenting some 
of the results obtained from our own research that allow us to formulate a 
hypothesis about the way attribution of responsibility worked in the last elec-
tions. Then, we will empirically test the hypothesis with the help of the CIS 
panel study. With regard to the first, we must keep in mind, for now, the 
contrast between our groups’ agendas and the media agendas, because, just as 
the agenda expressed spontaneously by our groups proposed one main issue, 
immigration7, the media agenda, in contrast, proposed another very different 
priority, terrorism8. On this point, our study gave the groups the opportunity 
7 We must remember that it is a group made up of workers from the Madrid metropolitan area.
8 Other studies have reached similar conclusions: Pujol 2008.
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to pronounce themselves regarding the dominant frames of both issues. As 
the reader will recall, each frame has two components, the diagnosis of the 
problem and attribution of responsibility, so that the groups had to choose 
which of the diagnoses and which formula of attribution of responsibility 
were closer to their own views. In the case of immigration, the frame was 
made up of the following two pairs of statements:
Diagnosis:
a) “immigration is good for the economy but is a risk for social coexistence 
and the proper functioning of social services”
b) “immigration is not just good for the economy, but also because it 
makes Spain an open and more tolerant country”
Attribution of responsibility: 
a) “the problem of immigration is a consequence of how government re-
gulates this issue” 
b) “the problem of immigration is a global problem that no single country 
can solve by itself” 
In the case of terrorism, the components of the frame were: 
Diagnosis:
a) “the ‘peace process’ is an opportunity for ETA to grow stronger” 
b) “it is an opportunity for peace in the Basque Country” 
Attribution of responsibility:
a) “the PP’s use of terrorism is an obstacle to ending violence in the Bas-
que Country” 
b) “the problem for putting an end to ETA is the government’s weakness 
and zapatero’s concessions”
The result of this first test was rather paradoxical because, in the case 
of immigration, a negative diagnosis of the problem (throughout the panel 
study, the groups leaned toward the idea of immigration as “a risk for co-
existence”) was at no time accompanied by attribution of responsibility to 
the government, while in the case of terrorism, an initial diagnosis favorably 
influenced by ETA’s truce and the expectation of a “peace process” ended 
up by attributing responsibility to the government for carrying negotiations 
with ETA too far. In the first case, the non-attribution of responsibility was 
coherent with the idea that immigration is a “global problem”. In the second 
one, the attribution of responsibility was due to the dominant framing among 
the media (“weakness and concessions”), a frame of blame from the adversary 
press. 
In order to test our hypothesis empirically, let us again recall that, accor-
ding to the CIS post-electoral survey, the most frequently discussed issues 
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during the campaign were terrorism (28.1% of the answers), economic pro-
blems (22.4%), and immigration (7.4%). Moreover, the pre-electoral wave 
of this panel survey included a question about how the government’s per-
formance was evaluated on each of these issues. Therefore, the question to 
be answered may be formulated as follows: how much does the electorate’s 
evaluation of each of these issues influence the decision whether to vote for 
the PSOE or for the PP? Given that our own study refers to center voters, we 
will first present data referring to all voters, and then data referring to those 
voters who place themselves at the very center of the left-right scale (posi-
tion 5). As these center voters are those who are least influenced by ideology, 
we expect their voting to be more influenced by these issues. 
In order to answer this question, we provide the results from a logistic 
regression model to estimate the effect of each of the issues after controlling 
for social class9, education, and ideological distance10. The issues come from 
a pre-electoral question concerning how the government’s performance is 
evaluated on different subjects, on a five-point scale ranging from very good 
(1) to very bad (5). Table 3 shows the regression coefficients referring to each 
of the issues, and the changes in predicted probabilities between the extreme 
values of the scales. 
In short, the interpretation of the outcome is as follows: after controlling 
for social class, education and ideological distance, the highest coefficients 
correspond to terrorism, terrorism being the issue that influenced voting pro-
babilities the most (37% among all voters, 42% among center voters). In 
both cases, terrorism had a greater influence than immigration, and even 
greater than the economy, a difference that we can explain in terms of diffe-
rent levels and formulas of attribution of responsibility because, just as the 
government benefitted from a rather exonerative frame in the case of immi-
gration, it was harmed, in contrast, by a frame of blame related to the way it 
managed the “peace process”. 
9 The class model is the usual one in this kind of study: Goldthorpe’s five category model.
10 The ideological distance is the difference between the distance of the voter’s self-place-
ment and her placement of the two parties that make up the dependent variables (PP/PSOE).
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Table 3. Logistic regression to estimate the effect of agenda issues on 
voting Dependent variable: vote PP (1) / PSOE (0) 
All voters  
Coefficient (error) Signif. 
[Changes in predicted 
probabilities]
Only position 5  
Coefficient (error) Signif. 
[Changes in predicted 
probabilities]
Social Class (Ref. Cat.: unskilled 
manual)
• Self-Employed
• Service Class
• Non-manual
• Skilled manual
0.84 (0.19) **
0.72 (0.21) **
0.28 (0.22) 
0.05 (0.18) 
0.74 (0.30) **
0.71 (0.34) *
0.49 (0.35) 
0.21 (0.29) 
Education (Ref. Cat.: Primary 
level)
• Secondary
• University I
• University II
-0.18 (0.16) 
0.06 (0.25) 
0.55 (0.26) *
-0,17 (0.25) 
0.23 (0.37) 
1.08 (0.44) *
Ideological distance
Economy
Terrorism
Immigration
-0.53 (0.03) ** 
0.45 (0.08) ** [0.30]
0.59 (0.07) ** [0.37]
0.35 (0.08) ** [0.23]
-0.39 (0.05) ** 
0.32 (0.13) ** [0.28]
0.53 (0.12) ** [0.42]
0.42 (0.12) ** [0.34]
Number of cases
Chi squared
Pseudo R2
2721
1835.9
0.53
649
226.8
0.26
Source: CIS panel study 2750-2757 (2008). *Significant at 95%. **Significant at 99%.
4. Double conclusion
We began this article by studying the rationale behind political polari-
zation strategies, showing both the objectives that they pursue and the two 
kinds of effects they generate: on one hand, they increase participation whi-
le, on the other, they move the parties away from the median voter. This first 
conclusion seems, at first glance, to contradict the hypothesis of Ansolabe-
here and Iyengar (polarization and negativism feed abstention) and support, 
in contrast, the hypothesis of Martin (2008) in the sense that negativism 
stimulated participation in elections. But both hypotheses may also be com-
patible, so that abstention from elections by the more moderate voters is 
more than compensated for by the increase in participation from the more 
radical voters.  
In agreement with our main hypothesis, the media were successful not 
only in managing the thematic agenda, focused obsessively on terrorism, but 
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also in making the government responsible for that agenda, as can be ga-
thered from the dominant frame of terrorism (“weakness and concessions”). 
Far from being an isolated phenomenon, this unarguable leading role of te-
rrorism is part of a well-known pattern, typical of situations of political po-
larization, according to which the positional issues –the ones that mark an 
ideological position– are displaced by ideologically transversal issues (Mara-
vall 2008). This tendency is fundamental to understanding why the socialist 
government did not manage to capitalize on its achievements in the social 
and economic terrains and why the economy continues to be its Achilles’ 
heel in citizens’ evaluations. 
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